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'Their problems are in many ways ours too' – The Tanzanian *Ujamaa*-philosophy in Swedish foreign aid information and the *Karibu* Campaign of 1974

Lars Diurlin

This article examines Karibu*, a 1974 nation-wide Swedish governmental information campaign about Tanzania aimed at influencing public opinion in favor of Sweden's aid policies. The campaign praised President Julius Nyerere's* Ujamaa*-philosophy of communal farming even as it turned into coercive displacement of millions of Tanzanians. Drawing from archival sources and read against research on Swedish foreign aid history and issues of representation in development aid discourses, the study is driven by the assumption that post-colonial aid-relations share with colonialism the perceived necessity for the donor/colonizer to justify its actions by communicating 'knowledge' about the aid-receiver/colonized subject back to the home-front. The result shows that such representations do not necessarily uphold the traditional interpretative privilege and agency of the Global North. In* Karibu*, the Ujamaa-philosophy saturated the campaign to such an extent that it even shaped Swedish agency in blind compliance with Nyerere's development politics.*

KEYWORDS Swedish foreign aid history; post-colonial relations; Tanzania; governmental information; *Ujamaa*; media history of development

Introduction

In October 1974, a governmental information campaign about Tanzania was launched in Sweden under the name *Karibu*, meaning 'welcome' in Swahili. Earlier in the year, news media had described it as 'the largest information venture ever to take place in Sweden' – a 'multimedia enterprise' (*Dagens Nyheter*, 16 May 1974). Behind the campaign stood its main funder, the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), together with the non-governmental adult education association Folkbildningsförbundet (FBF) and the state-funded monopoly-holding broadcasting company Sveriges Radio (SR). The campaign was framed as a cultural exchange between the two nations, and a Tanzanian committee was tied to the project, sanctioned by the Julius Nyerere-led TANU-government of the one-party state that had become independent from colonial rule in 1961.

SIDA's Head of Information Bo Kärre stated in FBF's monthly that *Karibu* 'is a challenge' for all Swedes 'to care about the welfare of other people.'[1] This was a critical

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aspect for SIDA since Sweden was positioning itself internationally as a frontrunner of foreign aid generosity, determined to reach the United Nations's call to rich nations to reserve one per cent of the GDP for foreign aid, which in the early 1970s had yet to be reached by any nation. If Sweden was to achieve it in the mid-1970s as planned, the spiraling aid budget (increased 25% each year from 1968) needed to be publicly legitimized. The main obstacle was, according to SIDA, the public's alleged lack of global knowledge and solidarity. Consequently, the implementation would depend on attitude-changing governmental actions.[2]

Throughout *Karibu*, Nyerere's catchword *Ujamaa* ('extended family' in Swahili) permeated the media produced for the campaign. *Ujamaa* was described by Nyerere as a form of 'African socialism' which combined European socialist doctrines (social and economic equalization and nationalization) with what he saw as African pre-colonial values of agrarian self-reliance and non-exploitive classless communal living.[3] Fearing division between the communities comprising Tanzania, *Ujamaa* functioned as a unifying term. In practice, it was intended to encourage Tanzanians to move to farming co-operatives planned by the government based on the perceived need to concentrate the population in standardized units to supply water, healthcare and education, and thereby speed-up the nation's modernization process.[4] It was just that too few heeded the call. Consequently, in 1969, policy changes were made which legitimized forced displacement, and in 1973 Nyerere issued the statement that 'to live in villages is an order.'[5] What followed has been described as one of the greatest resettlement efforts in the history of Africa, where up to 13 million people were displaced.[6] Nonetheless, the *Karibu* campaign was launched and continued well into 1976, during which Sweden, as the first country in the world, reached the 1% target.[7] Simultaneously, it became apparent to the world that Nyerere's *Ujamaa*-philosophy, and the villagization process that followed it, was not the ideal 'third-world' development strategy the *Karibu* campaign hailed it to be, but rather an economic, ecological and humanitarian failure.[8]

This article is demarcated to investigate the reasoning behind the *Karibu* campaign along with issues of representational agency embedded in campaign documents and media. The purpose is to unpack a critical discussion aiming to problematize the post-colonial aid relationship which, at least on paper, was thought to reverse a former exploitative colonial Global North–South-relation into an association based on economic transfers and technological help.

The first analytical section will discuss the following questions: Did the Swedish organizers relinquish agency over the produced body of knowledge in favor of the Tanzanian counterpart, or did the organizers strive to uphold control over the campaign, thereby continuing an interpretative privilege traditionally held by the Global North? Furthermore, can the campaign material be said to have widened or bridged the binary separation—conspicuous in colonial discourse—between 'Us' and 'Them'? The second section scrutinizes how the campaign related to Nyerere's *Ujamaa*-philosophy, asking: In what way was *Ujamaa* used as a catchword, and how did *Karibu* relate to the simultaneous villagization operation in Tanzania?

Preceding the analysis, the campaign will be contextualized in relation to the governmental effort to internationalize the Swedish citizen and legitimize its foreign (aid) politics by using information as an attitude-changing tool. Then follows a theoretical

discussion on how *Karibu* can be understood in relation to earlier research on western foreign aid media representations of the Global South. In conclusion, the study will challenge the common assumption that western representations of aid receivers are fixed in a domestically enclosed communication loop (in this case, from swedes to swedes) which tends to reproduce colonial stereotypes, denying the portrayed agency while reinforcing the distance between 'Them' and 'Us.'

The study builds on documents in the archive of Swedish National Television, along with SIDA documents found in the National Archive of Sweden. To trace the discourse surrounding the campaign, the *Ujamaa*-philosophy and the villagization-operation, the Royal Library's archive of digitized newspapers has been systematically checked, concentrating on the period 1960–1980. Regarding the campaign media, the study focuses on the main printed material: the study book *Tanzania och vi*, the *Karibu* magazine, and the official evaluation *Karibu-projektet*. Regarding audiovisual media, the study is limited to what has been preserved: the four-part TV-series *Karibu Tanzania* (SIDA's audiovisual archive), the documentary *Kooperationen—Ujamaa*, and one episode of the three-part TV-series *Karibu Maisha* (both in the Swedish Media Database).

Contextualizing Karibu—Swedish Foreign Aid (Information) Policy

The decolonialization process in the Global South following the Second World War opened possibilities for transnational relations between ex-colonies and small states that had played a less conspicuous role in colonialism. Benefiting from a mutually supportive international order, Sweden saw development cooperation as an investment in a peaceful future. Aid also added the dividend of international good-will—a much-needed compensatory move after the faint wartime neutrality.[9] Consequently, during the 1960s, the Social Democratic government initiated an active foreign policy with aims to influence the democratization of the world.[10] The same decade saw the first foreign aid bill (1962) and the creation of SIDA (1965). Development cooperation became an integrated component in the new internationalism, with the possibility of extending the concept of welfare state solidarity, mainly toward countries striving for social and economic equalization.[11] In particular, Swedish state actors sought to profile themselves as anti-colonial advocates on the side of the new nations.[12] The historical formation of Swedish development cooperation can thus be characterized by tensions between moral altruistic ideals and harsh political realities. Foreign aid became an unavoidable necessity—the only realistic way for a small nation to gain a platform in a post-colonial world.[13]

Early on, Tanganyika (Tanzania from 1964)—or 'the shining star of Africa' as it was known in Nordic foreign policy discourse—became a favored aid recipient. Historians have listed several reasons for this. The nation's African socialism was akin to Social Democrat welfare state-values and its stance on global issues (cold-war neutrality and African liberation) held a strong appeal. Its function as a regional bulwark against Apartheid positioned it as a post-colonial model nation and node for Sweden's support (from 1969) to liberation movements in Southern Africa.[14] Other aspects applied as well, such as the preference of the English language and (reasonable) political stability and social homogeneity. Engagement in Tanzania also held the potential to attract global attention, a form of goodwill-marketing of Sweden. Since few donors were active in the region, it was

simply the best choice for maximum international visibility.[15] Consequently, around 1970, Tanzania housed Sweden's largest development office and the highly profiled joint development projects: The Nordic Tanganyika Centre (1963) and The Nordic Co-operative Assistance Project (1968).

Still, it was perhaps the charismatic Nyerere, more than TANU's politics, who managed to attract the romanticized fascination—or 'Tanzaphilia'—so overtly visible in Swedish daily newspapers and travel reports in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[16] There were also personal ties between the nations—the most important being missionary Barbro Johansson's friendship with Nyerere. Johansson had not only become a Tanganyikan citizen but a TANU cabinet minister and staunch *Ujamaa*-advocate (*Dagens Nyheter*, 14 December 1970). An often-rendered 1961-episode tells of Johansson introducing Nyerere to her friend, Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander, thus instigating a bilateral relation which, half a century later, was assessed historically as a principal pipeline for Swedish development aid.[17]

Another zone of contact was the widespread support from the 1960s and onwards to Tanzanian adult education and vocational training via Swedish aid-funded NGOs (such as the associations constituting FBF) and so-called 'folk development colleges' – an 'africanized' state-run version of the Swedish Folk High Schools.[18] While earlier research on such collaborations has focused on the transfer and transformation of Swedish educational policies and practices when adapted to a Tanzanian context, this article concentrates on a proposed cultural/knowledge transfer in the opposite direction, aimed at the Swedish public, albeit under the auspices of related Swedish state- and NGO-actors.

The choice to concentrate on Tanzania in the *Karibu* campaign was logical, but also pragmatic. As SIDA's Thorsten Nilsson pointed to during the planning phase, the *Karibu* campaign intended to 'reflect the problems of developing countries in a principled way' and Tanzania could be used 'as a pedagogic example.'[19] FBF's Boris Enquist echoed this when legitimizing the choice in SIDA's staff magazine: 'It makes it easier, both pedagogically and technically, to concentrate on one country.'[20] SR's Bo Lundberg reasoned similarly when discussing the campaign with FBF's Ulla Poppius in 1972: 'Why Tanzania? It may seem 'worn out' as an area of interest.'[21] Lundberg continued with the rational statement that since there already existed a certain knowledge about Tanzania, the campaign could simply 'exploit' and 'piggyback' on that interest. Enquist later elaborated the argument into a communication strategy: 'Many Swedes – not least public educators […] have acquired knowledge of and relationships with Tanzania. These can be used as informants.'[22] The strategy of employing proxies to maximize information diffusion was in line with an information plan that SIDA had, at the request of the government, produced in 1971 with the aim to internationalize the Swedish citizen and retrospectively reinforce a legitimization of the 1968 one percent-target. The plan, which generated one of the largest budgets for domestic information of any Swedish authority, echoed the international aspirations of the government:

> A general strengthening and expansion of international awareness should have epidemic consequences that will gradually have a profound impact on our society. Prime Minister Olof Palme put it this way in 1970: 'We want to internationalize Swedish society. It is one

> of the most important tasks of the 1970s. […] This requires knowledge, and it requires a debate that affects our attitudes.'[23]

SIDA's approach was to channel funds through the infrastructure of civil society, using NGOs (including FBF) and individual opinion-makers, in an information-by-proxy strategy which was thought to create a buffer-zone between the attitude-shifting governmental intentions and the citizens.[24] This strategy should be understood in a larger context of an intervening governmental approach adopted by the welfare state after the Second World War with the intention to influence its citizens' behaviors using information as a controlling device.[25]

There was a postulate for the politics of international solidarity. It could only be enacted by way of public support, and neither SIDA nor the government believed that such support was strong. This conviction was based on a 1970 study by sociologist Stig Lindholm claiming that swedes' knowledge of and interest in global poverty was low. Lindholm's research permeated SIDA's strategies and was upheld by the *Karibu* organizers as a reason behind the campaign's initiation (*Dagens Nyheter*, 16 May 1974). Both an overall psychological resistance and the geographical distance to poor countries, Lindholm argued, had to be overcome if the state was to 'reduce the probability for protests against the prevailing foreign aid policies as well as the rapidly escalating aid budget.'[26] Sweden's desire to reach the one-percent target and establish a geopolitical foothold thus depended on the internationalization of its citizens' 'perception of reality,' as SIDA phrased it.[27] To attain this, Swedes had to 'face the concrete experience of life in a developing country' as outlined in a *Karibu* draft, arguing that since it was impossible to send all Swedes to a developing country 'one could imagine transferring people, environments, phenomena, objects, thoughts, feelings, points of view, etc. from a developing country to Sweden.'[28] This was the core issue that *Karibu* was hoped to solve.

Representations of the Other in Post-colonial Aid Relations

Following Stuart Hall, representation can be defined as the process by which members of a culture—wherein people share similar 'conceptual maps' and thus 'make sense of the world in similar ways'—use language, images and other sign systems to produce and exchange meaning.[29] Furthermore, *Othering* can be understood as a historically constructed binary separation aimed at exaggerating and maintaining a distance and difference between categories such as 'us' and 'them' and asserting the naturalness and primacy of 'our' culture and worldview.[30] This study maintains that although the intentions of the 'aiding' development donor and the 'exploitative' colonizer could be perceived as opposites, the representations generated by both are often constructed for similar reasons: to legitimize the presence of the colonizer or donor and the continuation of the colonial or developmental project. In the case of foreign aid information, this implicates—regardless of intention—a power relation between an observing culture and an *Other* being gazed at and defined. The body of knowledge which makes up *Karibu* can therefore be understood as related to what Edward Said terms a colonial 'archive of information' and V.Y. Mudimbe refers to as a 'colonial library,' consisting of representations which both define and constrain those observed and made 'known.'[31]

This article adheres to the observation that colonialism can be understood as a global process which, in different ways, marked and involved not just colonized and colonizer, but societies traditionally thought to be situated 'outside' the history of colonialism.[32] The last decades have seen investigations into Sweden's historical relations to colonialism, questioning the traditionally sustained notion (not least in foreign aid historiography) that Sweden has no or at most an insignificant colonial past.[33] Scholars adopting a broader understanding of colonialism, not reduced to formal possession of foreign territories, uphold that colonial interaction, especially regarding small nations, should be viewed as a multidirectional process enacted through entangled encounters encompassing a range of informal, circuitous, and ambiguous, yet asymmetrical, power relations taking the guise of trade, investments, natural resource extraction, loans, cultural engagements, and development aid.[34] In their study of Swedish colonial engagements in the industrial age, Per Högselius, David Nilsson, and Hanna Vikström claim that *anti-colonial* support should, paradoxically, be added to the list, as it has been a critical element in a certain 'Swedish colonial style' used as 'a strategic tool in the quest for profits and influence in the (post)colonial world.'[35] The *Karibu* campaign was not implemented for short-term financial gain. But, as the present study shows, it was executed as a political legitimization of and a final propagandistic push to achieve the one percent-target by utilizing Tanzania as a 'pedagogic example.'

As claimed by postcolonial scholars, from Said to Molefi K. Asante, Ania Loomba, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith, securing the power to construct and 'know' the *Other* and communicate that 'knowledge' back to the homefront was central to the maintenance and justification of colonialism.[36] This study suggests that post-colonial development-relations, such as Sweden–Tanzania, share with colonialism the perceived necessity to communicate back an image of the aid-receiving/colonized subject. In both situations, the representations are constructed with motives of persuasion in mind and fraught with epistemological claims of veracity. As such, they create what Paul S. Landau and Deborah D. Kaspin have distinguished as 'ideal forms that fit discursively into the administrative apparatus,' which, for Landau and Kaspin, comprise the colonial enterprise and its depictions of colonized subjects.[37] This article argues that SIDA's information strategies—for which the massive multimedia effort *Karibu* was the *pièce de resistance*—construct a similar 'administrative apparatus' set to generate 'ideal forms' intended to make the aid-receivers and their problems 'known.' In this representational process of persuasion, there is a palpable risk that the post-colonial aid relation preserves the Enlightenment doctrine of dividing the world into developmental stages that pronounces certain places as 'not yet' and others as 'now,' as formulated by Dipesh Chakrabarty.[38] According to this doctrine, the history of mankind occurs along a continuum where societies reflect different stages in an evolutionary process. Post-development critics have contended that this hierarchical model, which legitimized the colonial project and the white man's burden to civilize the 'uncivilized,' also influenced the modernization theories foregrounded in post-war development.[39] Continuing this argument, Pal Ahluwalia points out that the western perspective of development—and Africa's failure to achieve it—has entrapped the continent within a discourse of power where foreign institutions and aid agencies—'the new "colonial administrators"'—continue to map out its future, cementing the colonial image of Africa as 'an abnormality.'[40]

Research on foreign aid representations has drawn from the post-development school the notion that language and imagery in development aid discourse have tended to maintain representational structures inherited from colonialism. Informed by Mudimbe and Hall, Maria Eriksson Baaz upheld the representational categories of *evolution* and *otherness* as embedded in aid–donor relations, forming dichotomous systems built around the binarity of *Now/Us* opposite *Then/Them*.[41] It is primarily such tropes that scholars of representation in development discourse, such as Eriksson Baaz, Nandita Dogra, May-Britt Öhman, Henrietta Lidchi, Hanne Løngreen, Abhishek Bhati and Angela M. Eikenberry, and Magnus Dahlstedt and Henrik Nordvall, have called attention to. In studies ranging from Swedish 1950s' charity campaigns to 1980s' descriptions by Swedish aid-workers establishing educational centers in Tanzania, to promotion images used by international NGOs in the 2010s, the scholars sustain that western representations of aid receivers have continually portrayed them as infantilized inferior objects of pity, bearers of 'absolute difference,' part of an anonymous passive mass occupying a static world which houses the problem while the solution only can emanate from the Global North.[42] Reinforcing the distance between 'Them' and 'Us,' the cause of global poverty is represented as 'out there,' omitting explanations relating to colonialism and exploitation. Representation in development discourse has thus been discussed as an enclosed communication loop of information, *from* as well as *to* the Global North, excluding Global South agency.[43] Following this research, *Karibu* could be approached in a similar fashion. However, as the analysis will show, such presuppositions are too simplified.

Negotiating Representational Agency

Karibu was intended to generate what the organizers called 'developing country deliverance' ('u-landsfrälsning') subjecting the Swedish 'unmotivated majority' to a 'process of habituation,' thus aspiring for the epidemic consequences urged for in SIDA's information plan.[44] Every media output was intricately designed by the coordination group. However, the organizers had to give extensive concessions to the FBF, whose associations were to decide the content of four TV-documentaries (including *Kooperationen—Ujamaa*) and 11 radio shows—produced with the specific purpose to 'raise the temperature' in anticipation of the associations' forthcoming study circles that were to 'activate' swedes across the nation.[45] The fact that the FBF programs were, in Lundberg's words, 'based on a rhapsodic composition of special interests' was criticized by a fellow organizer Evan Ericsson, based at the Institute for Adult Education in Dar Es Salam.[46] Ericsson disparaged that the project was gravely 'Sweden-focused' and 'un-African' in its emphasis on Christian morning services, unions, and alcohol issues, neglecting Tanzania's real problems.[47] FBF's significant influence on the *Karibu* material can be explained by the fact that the state actors saw the NGOs as key proxies in the national foreign aid information strategy. Furthermore, as Nikolas Glover has pointed to regarding the Swedish education associations' formative impact on aid-funded education in Tanzania, the associations were driven by the strategic opportunity to revitalize their national course offerings and legitimize their status as contemporaneously relevant.[48]

Lundberg pleaded to Ericsson to not voice his concerns to 'official persons' since that would 'decrease the education association's commitment' to the campaign.[49] Lundberg's

suppression of critique notwithstanding, there was an ongoing debate among the organizers on how to frame the campaign as a cultural exchange, and 'convey the image of a reality as it is perceived by the people who live in it—[with] as little Swedish processing and interpretation as possible.'[50] Such negotiations between controlling and relinquishing agency were not only at the crux of *Karibu*, but came to permeate the international mid-1970s discourse on decolonializing Global North/South-information flows, later manifested in the 1976 call by Global South-countries for a New World Information and Communication Order.[51]

Lidchi, Eriksson Baaz, and Dogra have upheld that questions of representational agency moved onto the agenda of development aid organizations following the Ethiopian famine in the mid-1980s.[52] This assertion needs to be problematized, as it could be upheld that SIDA, already around 1970, was a progressive advocate for representational equity. The 'right of developing countries to describe their own problems' was a vital issue recognized in the 1971 information plan, and the *Karibu* study-book commenced with a call to 'free ourselves from ethnocentrism' and 'look at Tanzania through the eyes of a Tanzanian.'[53] In a 1974 internal SIDA report, it was maintained that foreign aid information must adapt to the donor/receiver relationship as an equal liaison built on fair and reciprocal economic and cultural exchanges. The report highlighted *Karibu* as 'the largest and most important experiment' dealing specifically with representational issues.[54]

Nevertheless, in practice, aspirations of representational equality seem to have collided with the need to develop a powerful campaign, balancing the comfortable familiarity of the presupposed against the distancing unfamiliarity of new knowledge. For example, the organizers stressed that 'a Swedish aspect' needed to permeate the campaign since it was aimed at a Swedish audience.[55] Poppius remarked that there is nothing wrong 'in initially exploiting our attraction to the exotic, if it is done in a conscious effort to ensure that the contact leads to identification.'[56] Moreover, SIDA emphasized to its collaborators that the campaign was not to appear as 'SIDA-propaganda.'[57] If it resembled 'information,' or came through as 'educational,' people might shield themselves.[58] Consequently, SIDA and SR agreed that it was necessary to resort to 'pleasure-oriented program formats' and 'TV-stunts' as gateways into the campaign, with the objective to 'break down the Swedish public's resistance toward information on developing countries.'[59] If *Karibu* was to envelop the population, it had to make use of the already preconceived, cast in an accessible and entertaining format.

The first gateway was the lush *Karibu* magazine. It included crossword puzzles, travel reports, cooking recipes, and comic strips designed to activate the reader's lust for knowledge by translating Tanzanian phenomena into a Western popular culture setting where the reader would feel comfortable, and thus open to persuasion. The second gateway was the TV-drama *Karibu Maisha* filmed in Tanzania by a predominantly Swedish team, with Tanzanian actors. The Tanzanian coordination committee was engaged in pre- and post-production, approving the script and the editing.[60] These contributions notwithstanding, the series was referred to by the organizers as 'The Forsythe-saga,' since the ambition was to create a product with the same popular impact the British 1967 TV series had had in Sweden.[61] It inevitably seems to have been more important that the gateway media included phenomena that could interest the unmotivated majority ('so

that they will start to talk about it at work'), than conveying knowledge about/from Tanzania and/or Tanzanians.[62]

The gateway-media were shaped to paraphrase Landau and Kaspin into 'ideal forms' with the objective of fitting into the overall strategy of the campaign-apparatus. The interpretative privilege to make the *Other* 'known' and communicate that knowledge to the homefront was clearly upheld by the Swedish organizers. Still, at a later stage knowledge-construction was to be partly relinquished, albeit not to the Tanzanian counterpart, but to Swedish public educators-cum-information proxies. One such activation instrument, inspired by American PR-research, was announced in the *Karibu* magazine: a competition with the prize of 'make your own TV-program in Tanzania!'.[63] Broadcast as *Safari* in 1975, the result (today lost) unmistakably evokes a power relation between an observing culture and an *Other* being gazed at and made 'known.'

At the first glance, *Karibu* seems to echo what earlier research has described as a domestically enclosed communication loop, where the portrayed culture is denied agency and the distance between 'Them' and 'Us' is reinforced. Yet, as the next section will show, this is a simplified conjecture.

Blinded by Tanzaphilia

Succeeding the gateway-media was the four-part TV-series *Karibu Tanzania*, produced by Lundberg. It addresses Tanzania's pre-colonial history and post-colonial development, interspersed with discussions by a Swedish studio-panel. Like other campaign media, such as the study-book and the documentary *Kooperationen—Ujamaa*, the program foregrounds colonial exploitation as the main cause behind global poverty. Thus, when compared to how earlier research on foreign-aid information has discussed issues of agency and global responsibility, the campaign does not fit the established mold. Instead of pointing to causes intrinsic to the Global South, *Karibu Tanzania* offers a reckoning with colonial and neo-colonial oppression. Furthermore, the program does not deflect responsibility as something only involving the colonial powers but presents it in terms of a global process implicating all, including Swedes. As stated by social economist Göran Dahlgren: 'The white man's burden creeps up on you, you are ashamed, you are complicit, it is part of your own culture to have exploited these continents.' Dahlgren's avowal was part of an interactive segment ending each episode with thoughts from Swedes and Tanzanians who had watched the episode beforehand. The final episode's last words, shared by an unnamed Tanzanian, are especially forceful:

> When the so-called developed world makes programs like this, the Third World doesn't get much out of it. What they're really doing is continuing the old cultural exploitation that they practiced during colonial times. They go to less developed countries and collect cultural material which they show to their home audiences. This is what we call neo-cultural exploitation.

As a closing declaration, it highlights a progressive and self-critical representational awareness on the side of the campaign. At the same time, it buttresses this study's hypothesis that post-colonial development-relations share with colonialism the perceived necessity to communicate back a controlled image of the aid-receiving/colonized subject.

Karibu Tanzania emphasizes transnational identification (rather than distancing *Othering*) between the two nations' inhabitants through a technique of juxtaposition. The program begins with an equalization of pre-industrial Sweden and pre-colonial East Africa, highlighting historical similarities between two 'established and well-functioning societies.' A similar technique is used in *Kooperationen—Ujamaa* which underlines the transferability of Swedish cooperative solutions to the *Ujamaa*-politics of communalism. Likewise, the book *Tanzania och vi* employs juxtaposition as its starting point:

> One country is commonly referred to as developed, the other underdeveloped. Let us forget that for a moment and instead look upon Sweden and Tanzania as examples of 'countries,' any countries, somewhere on the globe where there are people who start families, people who work, eat, watches soccer, sleep, argue, discuss, make love.[64]

The method went in line with the campaign's stated purpose of 'reducing the emotional distance' to the people of Tanzania and 'increase the understanding that their problems are in many ways ours too.'[65] This equalization, which goes against the colonial evolutionary system, can be compared to Dahlstedt and Nordvall's findings when analyzing the formation of national self-images vis-à-vis images of Tanzanian *Others* in reports by Swedish educational aid-workers. The scholars state that 'the parties are described as equal, but fundamentally different,' 'learning' is framed as an evolutionary process, and the only parallel between the nations is found in 'Our history and Their present,' forming a 'paradox of solidarity.'[66] In the *Karibu* campaign, Swedes and Tanzanians rather share the same present, as well as a similar past. Importantly, bridging the geographical and emotional distance between Swedes and aid-receivers was an important goal for SIDA, as remoteness remained an alienating threat to public opinion.[67] Attempts at transnational identification thus permeated the campaign, seemingly placing it on the opposite end of the spectrum concerning binary colonial and ethnocentric tropes of 'absolute difference.'

However, the campaign's equalization of the two nations remains problematic since the idealized approximation went so far as to leave out signs of poverty and turmoil in most of the campaign material. As noted earlier, SIDA saw it as imperative for the internationalization of Sweden that its citizenry faced the concrete experience of life in the Global South. Still, what the people saw, heard, and read about everywhere (even in the gatefold sleeve of the campaign LP [Caprice Records, 1974]), was children at play and farmers hard at work, collectively committed to the nation and the TANU party. The people were faced with challenges, but as affirmed by the campaign, these were solvable through *Ujamaa*. The romanticized and pre-arranged imagery echoes what Bo Stråth has labeled '*Ujamaa* realism' and James C. Scott has described as 'a powerful aesthetic dimension of modernization at play.'[68] Reminiscent of East European socialist realism, it was a type of imagery preferred by the TANU-government as it demonstrated cohesion, efficiency, and portrayed idealized heroes rather than current conditions.

Consequently, the *Karibu* organizers can be said to have relinquished agency as part of the 'cultural exchange,' but in most cases it was a single voice that was heard. As in early 1970s Swedish news media, Tanzaphilia is blatantly visible throughout the campaign. It was also individually sustained by the organizers. For example, SIDA's Nilsson hailed Nyerere as 'one of the foremost teachers, leaders and politicians of our time.'[69] Nyerere's voice is undeniably the only strong individual Tanzanian agency emanating from the

campaign. The study book is practically constructed around his texts, and uncommented *Ujamaa* quotes (lacking sources) intersperse the chapters like a choir: '*We want ujamaa in Tanzania. Thank you to the president who gave freedom to Tanzania.*'[70]

As *Karibu* was launched with the magazine's invitation for all Swedes to 'make a journey of discovery in today's Tanzania,' Nyerere's villagization-operation ravished the nation—in the words of French onlooker Sylvain Urfer—'as if a tidal wave had washed over the country, with millions of people being moved in a dictatorial manner.'[71] The *Karibu* magazine promised its armchair explorers 'glimpses of everyday life, where you get to meet Tanzanians in their own homes.'[72] The concurrent uprooting and dislodgment of said people and homes was not addressed. The magazine stands as a suitable symbol for the 'blind spots' that arose from the Tanzaphilian ideological identification, which, according to social scientists Göran Hydén and Kenneth Mease, caused SIDA, and the Swedish government, to naïvely 'shut out any negative feedback that otherwise would have been a cause for revision' and trigger unfavorable domestic public opinion.[73] Hydén, who was based at the University of Dar es Salaam, contributed material to *Karibu*, but he also, in early 1974, completed a critical report for SIDA on the ongoing villagization-operation. It detailed that:

> *Ujamaa* has not led to any kind of economic equation and almost all productive investment has been lost. [—] The common way for villages to be constructed is to take advantage of famines and tempt people to a village with promises of food. [—] To make sure people can't move back, their houses have been destroyed [—]. We have all reasons to expect more forced displacement than during the colonial era.[74]

The Tanzania-office stamped Hydén's report as 'confidential' but sent it to the board of SIDA as 'recommended reading' in June 1974.[75] Unquestionably, there would have been time to, if not cancel, at least revise the campaign. Still, no reservations can be traced in the archive documents, except for Hydén's report and Ericsson's letter—that is, from two participants living in Tanzania.

The only campaign media that touches upon the villagization-operation is *Karibu Tanzania*, where it is discussed albeit not criticized. Rather, it is treated as a sine qua non for a better (developed) future. The voice-over explains, over persuasive headlines from the (TANU-controlled) *Daily News* and idealized images of happy farmers, that those Tanzanians who remain skeptical just need to be persuaded. The panel-discussants concurred, as summarized by Public Educator Ingemar Sallnäs: 'Peasant conservatism must be broken down. How much violence one is prepared to accept for things to be better for the people is a balancing act. I am convinced that this is a step in the right direction.' It is reasonable to say that *Karibu Tanzania's* pragmatic stance on necessary coercion in the name of development echoes the rationalization and justification of the colonial civilizing mission with its forced displacements and assimilations of indigenous populations.

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this article has not been to infer a simple equation between colonialism and development aid. However, what *Karibu Tanzania's* rationalizing comments on the villagization-operation bluntly demonstrate—and even more so the abundant silence

on the matter throughout the campaign—is that the threshold supposedly separating colonialism and development aid can be liminal and that representations stemming from both phenomena are enmeshed in a defining and constraining body of knowledge, be it a 'colonial' or a 'developmental library.' Nevertheless, this study has shown that such representations are not necessarily identical, as it sometimes has been presupposed. Rather, as *Karibu* demonstrates, they do not always adhere to colonial assertions regarding *Othering*, stereotypes of deviation, reasons for global poverty, or an increased distance (temporal or spatial) between 'Us' and 'Them.'

There is throughout *Karibu* a discernable desire to portray an aid-receiver that could mirror 'Us' rather than pathologize a distant 'Them.' Still, there is a naïve tendency in the persistent efforts of cross-cultural identification to equalize the lives and conditions of the two peoples—to try and 'forget' the differences, since 'their problems are ours too.' Coupled with the fact that Tanzania was utilized as a model-country, a Global South-archetype, perhaps not so much representing itself, as representing (the most 'successful' of) *all* Swedish aid-receivers, what appears to be an altruistic anti-colonial rapprochement could also be interpreted as calculated instrumentalism in service of both domestic and global political goals—a perfect example of what Högselius, Nilsson, and Vikström delineate as the paradoxical anti-colonial 'Swedish colonial style' and Dahlstedt and Nordvall coin the 'paradox of solidarity.' As initially stated, the formation of Swedish foreign aid has been characterized by such tensions between moral ideals and political realities. To this, should be added the fact that SIDA, with knowledge of the ongoing coercive villagization-operation, still opted to launch the campaign along with its 'pleasure-oriented programs.' It can only be assumed that the appealing *Ujamaa*-philosophy and the charming Nyerere was too fitting as tools in SIDA's attitude-changing efforts to be hampered by the realities that simultaneously faced the people of Tanzania.

Approaching *Karibu* as a domestically enclosed communication loop, as it first appeared to be, proved not sufficient. The TANU party's '*Ujamaa* realism' saturates the campaign to such an extent that it shaped Swedish agency in Tanzaphilic compliance with it. The organizers' desire to relinquish agency and uphold 'information decolonialization' was thus, in a way, achieved, but at the cost of allowing only one voice of post-coloniality to be heard. Contrary to claims made by several scholars of representation in development discourse, it can be established that when studying representations of global poverty, it is neither a given which side gains agency, nor is it certain that when the previously voiceless speaks, it speaks for the indigenous entity it seems to represent.

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Notes

1. Kärre, "Aspekten", 6.
2. Diurlin, "The Nordic Mobilization", 263–5.
3. Stråth, *Ujamaa and Ubuntu*, 19–21; Ahluwalia, *Politics and Post-colonial Theory*, 57; Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa*, 105.
4. Scott, *Seeing Like a State,* 230–1.
5. Coulson, 'Agricultural Policies", 74–8; Scott, *Seeing Like a State,* 234.
6. Paaskesen, "A Bleak Chapter", 464; Scott, *Seeing Like a State,* 223; Stråth, *Ujamaa and Ubuntu*, 33; Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 255. Estimates differ between 5–13 million.
7. Berg, Lundberg and Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift*, 325.
8. Stråth, *Ujamaa and Ubuntu,* 18, 33; Ahluwalia, *Politics and Post-colonial Theory*, 59; Scott, *Seeing Like a State,* 225.
9. Engh, "The Conscience", 69.
10. Marklund, *Neutrality and Solidarity,* 11.
11. Bergman Rosamond, "Swedish Internationalism", 466. Cf. Berg, Lundberg and Tydén , *En svindlande uppgift*, 462; Elgström "Giving Aid", 126–8.
12. Högselius, Nilsson and Vikström, *Neutrality's empire*, 220.
13. Berg, Lundberg and Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift*, 61, 90, 278, 652.
14. Berg, Lundberg and Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift*, 573; Paaskesen, "A Bleak Chapter", 458; Stråth, *Ujamaa and Ubuntu*, 40; Elgström, "Giving Aid", 117, 126–8; Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation*, 83.
15. Engh and Pharo, "Nordic Cooperation", 119–21.
16. Stråth, *Ujamaa and Ubuntu*, 22; Paaskesen, "A Bleak Chapter", 463; Berg, Lundberg and Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift*, 573. E.g., *Aftonbladet*, September 9, 1969; *Aftonbladet*, September 23, 1971; *Dagens Nyheter*, September 9, 1972; *Expressen*, October 28, 1973.
17. Mhina, "Barbro Johansson", 9; McGillivray et al., *Swedish Development*, 33.
18. Glover, "The 'Aidification'"; Rogers, "Cultural Transfer".
19. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, 18 June 1974. SNTDA.
20. Enquist, "Karibu", 4.
21. Letter, Lundberg to Poppius, undated but identified by author as early 1972. SNTDA.
22. Enquist, "Karibu", 4.
23. *U-Information*, 34.
24. Diurlin and Mohammadi Norén, "The Information-by-proxy Strategy", 151.
25. cf. Kjellgren, *Staten som Informatör*; Norén, *"Framtiden tillhör"*.
26. Lindholm, *U-landsbilden*, 226.
27. *U-information*, 22.
28. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, April 26–27 1972. SNTDA.
29. Hall, "The Work of Representation", 15–8, 61.
30. Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, *Post-colonial Studies*, 155; Dogra, *Representations of Global Poverty,* 96.
31. Said, Orientalism, 41–2; Mudimbe, *The Idea of Africa*, xii.
32. Eriksson Baaz, *The Paternalism*, 34; Cf. Hall, "When was the 'Post-colonial'?", 246–7.

33. E.g. Naum and Nordin (eds.), *Scandinavian Colonialism*; Fur, *Colonialism in the Margins*. For statements in foreign aid history on Sweden's lack of a colonial past, see Wohlgemuth, "Swedish relations", 46; Sellström, *Sweden and National Liberation*, 506.
34. Symonds, "Colonial Encounters", 311; Högselius, Nilsson and Vikström, *Neutrality's empire*, 8f.
35. Högselius, Nilsson and Vikström, *Neutrality's empire*, 221–6.
36. Said, *Orientalism*, 7–8; Asante, "Preface", 3; Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, 22; Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 63.
37. Landau and Kaspin, "Preface", xii.
38. Quoted in Sylvester, "Development studies", 712.
39. Kothari, *Rethinking Development*, 143. cf. Escobar, *Encountering Development*.
40. Ahluwalia, *Politics and Post-colonial Theory*, 53f.
41. Eriksson Baaz, "Introduction", 7.
42. Bhati and Eikenberry, "Faces of the needy", 39; Eriksson Baaz, "Biståndet och partnerskapets", 175; Lidchi, "Finding the right image", 94; Dogra, *Representations of global poverty*, 82; Løngreen, "The Development Gaze", 229; Öhman, "Sverige hjälper", 66f; Dahlstedt and Nordvall, "Paradoxes of Solidarity", 255.
43. cf. Wa'Njogo, "Representations of Africa", 76.
44. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, 26–28 April 1972; 1 March 1973, SNTDA; Enquist, "Tanzaniaprojektet", 12.
45. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, 1 March 1973, SNTDA.
46. Letter, Lundberg to Ericsson, 26 June 1973, SNTDA.
47. Letter, Ericsson to Lundberg, 12 January 1973, SNTDA.
48. Glover, "The 'Aidification'", 38.
49. Letter, Lundberg to Ericsson, 26 June 1973, SNTDA.
50. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, 26–28 April 1972, SNTDA.
51. Carlsson, "The rise and fall of NWICO", 39.
52. Dogra, *Representations of Global Poverty*, 191; Lidchi, "Finding the Right Image", 92–5; Eriksson Baaz, *The Paternalism*, 123.
53. *U-information*, 40–2; Wall, *Tanzania och vi*, 10.
54. Report, "Utvecklingssamarbete", 4 February 1974. SIDANA.
55. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, 20 February 1973, SNTDA.
56. Poppius, "Kulturpolitiska strävanden", 11.
57. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, 15 November 1972. SNTDA;
58. Minutes, *Karibu*-group, 20 February 1973. SNTDA; Hedman, *Karibu-projektet,* 81.
59. Minutes, TV1 Beredningsgrupp, 18 January 1973, SNTDA.
60. Letter, Lundberg to Willibard, 17 August 1973, SNTDA. The credits also include Tanzanian dramatist Penina O. Mlama but she does not figure in archival documents.
61. "Tanzania-projektet", March 1973.
62. Hedman, *Karibu-projektet*, 40.
63. Letter, Malm to Lundberg, 26 February 1974. SNTDA.
64. Wall, *Tanzania och vi*, 6.
65. Enquist, "Tanzaniaprojektet", 12.
66. Dahlstedt and Nordvall, "Paradoxes of Solidarity", 253–7.
67. Berg, Lundberg and Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift*, 377.
68. Stråth, *Ujamaa and Ubuntu*, 25; Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 231.

69. Nilsson, "Karibu – Tanzania", 1.
70. Wall, *Tanzania och vi*, 99.
71. Rydström, "Välkommen", 3; Sylvain Urfer quoted in Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 256.
72. Rydström, "Välkommen", 3.
73. Hydén and Mease, "Foreign Aid Agencies", 220; cf. Paaskesen, "A Bleak Chapter", 463; Berg, Lundberg and Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift*, 581; Simensen, "The Norwegian-Tanzanian", 66–8.
74. Hydén, "*Ujamaa*-rörelsen", SIDATAN.
75. Quarterly Report 2:1974, SIDATAN. This report resolves the suggestion by Berg, Lundberg and Tydén (579) that information about the operations reached SIDA:s Swedish headquarters 'at least by the turn of the year 1974/1975.'

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