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  • 1.
    Cieslak, Katarzyna
    et al.
    Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University.
    Hamberg, Mattias
    Univ Stavanger, Dept Accounting & Law, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway..
    Vural, Derya
    Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University.
    Executive compensation disclosure, ownership concentration and dual-class firms: An analysis of Swedish data2021In: Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, ISSN 1061-9518, E-ISSN 1879-1603, Vol. 45, p. 18-, article id 100429Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study how executive compensation disclosure (ECD) is affected by the economic incentives of owners and managers in a Swedish setting where agency conflicts are not so much between managers and owners, but between controlling and non-controlling owners. In our sample, control is often enhanced through mechanisms such as dual share classes. The analysis relies on detailed hand-collected ECD data from 2837 annual reports. As expected, disclosure decreases with ownership concentration and the owner’s excess voting rights. In Sweden, overpaid Chief Executive Offices (CEOs) improve ECD quality, but this is not the case when the controlling owner has excess control rights. This suggests that when managers have a bond with controlling owners, ECD is part of the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling owners, and executive compensation plays a different role than in previously studied Anglo-Saxon settings.

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  • 2.
    Hellman, Niclas
    et al.
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Nilsson, Henrik
    Stockholm School of Economics; University of Oulu.
    Tylaite, Milda
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Vural, Derya
    University of Borås, Faculty of Textiles, Engineering and Business.
    The Impact of an IFRS for SMEs-Based Standard on Financial Reporting Properties and Cost of Debt Financing: Evidence from Swedish Private Firms2022In: The European Accounting Review, ISSN 0963-8180, E-ISSN 1468-4497, p. 1-31Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2014, all larger Swedish private firms were required, at short notice, to adopt a new reporting standard (K3) based on IFRS for SMEs (2009 version). Using this shock to the reporting environment, we study the effects of the new reporting standard on groups' financial reporting properties and cost of debt financing. We find that, following the introduction of K3, private groups exhibit reporting changes consistent with improved accounting quality; their financial statement comparability increases; and their cost of debt declines. Our results suggest that the cost-of-debt decline is related to changes in accounting numbers that are imputed to lending models. Our findings add to the literature on factors shaping private firms' financial reporting and inform the ongoing discussion on accounting regulation for private firms.

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    fulltext
  • 3.
    Vural, Derya
    University of Borås, Faculty of Textiles, Engineering and Business.
    7 Ownership and usage of control-enhancing mechanisms2023In: Corporate Governance in a Nordic Setting: The case of Sweden / [ed] Peter Beusch , Kristina Jonäll, Svetlana Sabelfeld, Berlin: De Gruyter , 2023, p. 79-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this chapter, one of the unique features with the Swedish governance system is dis-cussed, namely the large presence of controlling owners and the frequent usage of so-called control-enhancing mechanisms (CEMs), i.e., control devices that allows separation of ownership and control. The chapter is divided into four sections, where Section 1presents a theoretical background to agency conflicts in firms with concentrated ownership. Section 2 continues with defining commonly applied CEMs and provides data on the usage of CEMs in Sweden and other European countries. Section 3 reviews accounting-and finance-oriented research studies with evidence on the effects of CEMs in Sweden. Last, Section 4 discusses the challenges with an EU-level corporate governance system. 

  • 4.
    Vural, Derya
    Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen.
    Disclosing the Books: Evidence on Swedish publicly listed firms' accounting disclosure practices2017Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Disclosure of accounting information is crucial in facilitating efficient contracts in the publicly listed firm and in reducing information asymmetries in capital markets. A well-known perception in disclosure literature is that, as the separation between managers and owners increases, so does the demand for publicly available disclosure. Many publicly listed firms around the world are controlled by a few large owners that obtain information through their insider positions in the firm. Thus, variations in ownership structures have a considerable effect on how firms’ disclosure practices are resolved. Despite the increased attention paid to the identity of controlling owners and their influence on financial reporting practices, little is known about how owner types and governance mechanisms influence corporate disclosures and capital-market effects. This thesis contributes to the disclosure literature by studying a context in which controlling owners have a large influence on the governance and disclosure practices of firms. This contrasts with the much-studied setting in which management influences the governance and reporting decisions of firms. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to examine the determinants and capital-market effects of Swedish listed firms’ annual report disclosure.

    This thesis uses a self-constructed disclosure index from manually gathered data from the annual reports of Swedish publicly listed firms during the years 2001 to 2013. This includes information on the notes to the financial statements, corporate governance and strategy. The findings of the four empirical studies show that the ownership structure of firms and the various contractual relationships that firms are engaged in, drive the disclosure practices. Additionally, the results indicate that higher levels of disclosure decrease information asymmetries between capital-market participants and increase trading activity. However, the findings also show that firms with controlling owners are less forthcoming with disclosure, even after a new disclosure reform. Considering the large influence of controlling owners in the studied context, these are important findings in the research field and in regulators’ processes of deriving disclosure regulation. The thesis concludes that the variety in firms’ disclosure incentives and local governance structures are important disclosure determinants to understand in framing international accounting standards.

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  • 5.
    Vural, Derya
    Department of Business Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Disclosure Practices by Family Firms: Evidence from Swedish Publicly Listed Firms2018In: Accounting in Europe, ISSN 1744-9480, E-ISSN 1744-9499, Vol. 15, no 3, p. 347-373Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I investigate the effect of family ownership on firms’ disclosure practices in their annual reports. In specific, I study Swedish publicly listed firms, which are typically characterized by controlling owners that have a strong influence in the corporate governance decisions of the firm, including corporate disclosures. To measure disclosure, I construct a comprehensive disclosure index covering information on (1) corporate governance, (2) strategic and financial targets and (3) notes to the financial statements. The results reveal that overall, family firms provide less disclosure in annual reports than non-family firms do. The finding is consistent with the premise that through their management positions, family owners can directly monitor managers and avoid costly public disclosures. Overall, the results suggest that ownership structure of firms is important to consider in understanding firms’ disclosure incentives, particularly in settings where controlling owners play a significant role in the governance of the firm.

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