A game-theoretic approach for textile manufacturer-buyer relation under quality inspection and traceability regime
2016 (English)In: Uncertainty Modelling in Knowledge Engineering and Decision Making: Proceedings of the 12th International FLINS Conference (FLINS 2016), 2016, Vol. 10, p. 785-793Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]
This paper studies the textile manufacturer–buyer relationship under quality inspection and traceability policy using non-cooperative Stackelberg game models. These models consider constant demand and price function, whereas the manufacturer and buyer regulate their profits by controlling product quality, transfer payment, quality inspection and traceability.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 10, p. 785-793
National Category
Business Administration
Research subject
Textiles and Fashion (General)
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hb:diva-10745DOI: 10.1142/9789813146976_0122ISI: 000417158200122Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85037344251ISBN: 978-981-3146-98-3 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hb-10745DiVA, id: diva2:974183
Conference
FLINS Conference, Roubaix, August 24-26, 2016
2016-09-252016-09-252018-11-26Bibliographically approved